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Abstract 
 
Using a panel of 72,172 manufacturing firms from 11 euro-area countries over the period 2006-
2015, we investigate how the stock of inventories relates to the extension of trade credit. 
Consistent with the inventory-management motive for offering trade credit, we find an inverse 
relationship between the two variables. This association is stronger for firms producing 
differentiated goods and during the recent sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, financial 
intermediation mitigates the inventory-management motive, especially during the crisis period. 
Our results are robust to using different definitions of trade credit and of the crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the period 2006-2015, the average ratio of trade credit extended to sales for firms in euro-
area countries was 28.0%. The ratio ranged from 8.8% in Germany to 59.3% in Greece.1,2 
These statistics indicate that companies direct a significant share of their sales to financing their 
customers, which may in turn have a positive feedback effect on their sales. At the same time, 
these firms had a 15.9% inventory-to-sales ratio on average; it ranged from 12.1% in Spain to 
23.1% in Ireland.3 Interestingly, figure 1 shows that the accounts receivable and stock of 
inventories (relative to sales) of euro-area firms move in opposite directions. This paper aims 
at explaining the reasons behind this pattern.  
Holding inventories is typically costly (Bougheas et al., 2009; Guariglia and Mateut, 
2016). Accordingly, it is sensible for firms to minimize their inventory-to-sales ratio by 
enhancing sales. One way to do this is to provide credit to financially constrained buyers, which 
results in accounts receivable. This is known as the inventory-management motive for offering 
trade credit. Bougheas et al. (2009) find evidence of such a trade-off between inventories and 
accounts receivable in the UK; Guariglia and Mateut (2016) also find evidence of it in China.4 
The trade-off between inventories and trade credit observed in Figure 1 could be an indication 
that the inventory-management motive also applies to firms in the euro-area. The first aim of 
this paper is to formally test whether this is the case. 
The 2010-2011 sovereign debt crisis was unprecedented, partly because it hit in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis5. European Central Bank (ECB) officials highlighted on 
many occasions the financing constraints that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
 
1
 Trade credit extended is also referred to as accounts receivable. Hereafter, we use these two terms 
interchangeably. 
2
 See Appendix B for descriptive statistics of relevant variables in each country. 
3
 Inventories (hereafter also referred to as stocks) include finished goods produced but unsold, work-in-progress, 
and raw materials. In our dataset we observe only total inventories and cannot distinguish between raw materials, 
work in process, and finished goods. 
4
 A negative relationship between trade credit and inventories is also consistent with Daripa and Nilsen (2011), 
who argue that sellers subsidize the shift of inventories to buyers. 
5Previous studies document the chronology of the euro-area sovereign debt crisis (e.g. Fernandes et al., 2019). 
The most severe phase of the crisis occurred in 2010–2011. The crisis period includes developments such as 
soaring government bond yields in the periphery of the euro area, downgrades by credit rating agencies, the 
initiation of a systemic response through bailouts, the ECB’s purchase of distressed bonds via the Securities 
Markets Programme, and the three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations at the end of 2011. By 2012, the 
worst was over; bond yields declined, especially after Mario Draghi’s announcement in July of that year that the 
ECB was ready to do whatever it took to preserve the euro (Fernandes et al., 2019). The announcement of the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme followed in August 2012. The OMT allowed the ECB to 
intervene in secondary sovereign bond markets, provided that the country requesting its intervention agreed a 
programme of economic adjustment. 
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faced during that period (Draghi, 2014), with credit weakness contributing to economic 
weakness.6 As a result of the financial pressure, firms in the euro area turned to alternative 
sources of financing, such as trade credit (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016; Casey and O’Toole, 
2014). Trade credit is a significant source of funds, particularly for firms that are running out 
of bank credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Nilsen, 2002). In line with this argument, figures 1 
and 2 show that accounts receivable substantially increased during the sovereign debt crisis.  
Considering that economic crises go hand in hand with increased demand uncertainty 
(ECB, 2016; Bloom et al., 2018; Kozeniauskas et al., 2018), it makes less sense for firms to 
hold costly inventories during those periods. The second aim of this paper is to investigate 
whether, in line with this argument, the trade-off between inventories and trade credit was 
magnified over the sovereign debt crisis period. Furthermore, we test whether the nature of the 
products transacted by firms (standardized versus differentiated)7, as well as the degree of 
financial development in the firm’s country affects the trade-off.  
Our analysis is based on a panel of 72,172 euro-area firms, sourced from AMADEUS, 
(Analyze Major Databases from European Sources) over the period 2006-2015. Previewing the 
main findings, we first show that inventories are negatively associated with trade credit 
extended. This supports Bougheas et al.’s (2009) inventory-management motive. Second, we 
find that the trade-off between inventories and trade credit in the euro area is magnified during 
the recent sovereign debt crisis, and is stronger for producers of differentiated goods. Third, 
we show that financial development attenuates the inventory-management motive. These 
results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. 
This paper brings together two strands of the literature on trade credit. The first is 
concerned with the motives for extending credit to customers and receiving trade credit from 
suppliers. Financial theories of trade credit dominate this strand, along with related empirical 
evidence regarding the relationship between trade credit and other balance sheet variables.8 
 
6 Several studies highlight how banking risk transformed the global financial crisis into a sovereign debt crisis, as 
well as the nexus between banking risk and sovereign risk (Alter and Schüler, 2012; De Bruyckere et al., 2013; 
Acharya et al., 2014; Delatte et al., 2017). Other studies examine how the euro-area sovereign debt crisis affected 
the availability of credit for SMEs. For example, Ferrando et al. (2017) find that during the sovereign debt crisis, 
SMEs in stressed countries were more likely to experience rationed credit. 
7  Differentiated goods are often linked to the needs of particular customers, whilst standardized products are off-
the-shelf products. Ng et al. (1999) and Mateut and Zanchettin (2013) show that the use of trade credit differs 
significantly across firms producing standardized and differentiated goods. See Section 5.3.1 for more details. 
8 As Bougheas et al. (2009) point out, the theoretical models on the determinants of trade credit relate to 
information asymmetry (Smith, 1987; Bias and Gollier et al., 1997), discrimination arguments (Brennan et al., 
1988), monitoring advantages (Mateut et al., 2006), product quality (Long et al., 1993), bankruptcy (Frank and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Wilner, 2000), opportunistic behavior (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004), and externalities (Daripa 
and Nilsen, 2011). For related empirical evidence, see among others, Mian and Smith (1992), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Fisman and Love (2003), Giannetti (2003), and Love et al. (2007). 
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The second strand focuses on how financial crises and associated financing constraints affect 
trade credit utilization. There is overall agreement that bank credit-constrained firms turn to 
trade credit during financial crises (Love et al., 2007; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garriga, 2013; Casey and O’Toole, 2014; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016).9  
We make three main contributions to this literature. First, we shed new light on the rather 
underexplored inventory-management motive and highlight its crucial role in the extension of 
trade credit to the euro-area corporate sector. Second, we investigate how recent turmoil in the 
euro area affected the trade-off between inventories and trade credit. In doing this, we extend 
the literature on economic crises in Europe, which, when it comes to financing effects, largely 
focuses on bank lending (Ferrando et al., 2017; Acharya et al., 2018). Whilst Casey and 
O’Toole (2014) and Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) investigate changes in the uptake of trade 
credit during crisis periods, our main emphasis is on trade credit extension. Third, this paper 
provides, for the first time, a systematic empirical analysis of how financial development 
affects the inventory-management motive. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data and 
presents summary statistics. Sections 3 develops our hypotheses. Sections 4 describes our 
methodology. Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Section 6 discusses robustness 
checks, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data and summary statistics 
 
2.1 Data description 
To construct our dataset, we use annual reports from AMADEUS, published by Bureau Van 
Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). The database comprises financial information on 19 
million public and private firms across European countries. We cover 2006 through 2015 and 
focus on manufacturing firms.10 We use two different versions of AMADEUS: AMADEUS 
November 2012 and AMADEUS January 2017. This approach allows us to address the 
potential attrition bias, as AMADEUS includes only firms that have not been inactive for more 
 
9 Theoretical models suggest that in the presence of ample liquidity, firms tend to finance themselves using 
relatively cheap bank credit. When liquidity dries up, they are more inclined to make use of more expensive trade 
credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Nilsen, 2002; Burkhart and Ellingsen, 2004). A related strand of literature 
considers how monetary policy tightening increases the utilization of trade credit, which helps firms absorb the 
effect of credit contractions (Choi and Kim, 2005; Mateut et al., 2006). 
10 We select only firms with unconsolidated statements. This avoids double-counting firms (Guariglia et al., 2016; 
Fernandes et al., 2019). 
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than four years. Our dataset spans 11 euro-area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.11,12  
Our final panel consists of 411,987 firm-year observations, which correspond to 72,172 
firms. We remove observations with negative sales and assets, and drop firms that do not have 
complete records on the variables used in our regressions. We also exclude firms with fewer 
than three years of consecutive observations. Following standard practice in the literature, we 
control for the potential influence of outliers by excluding observations in the 1% tails of each 
of our regression variables13. 
Our panel is unbalanced. Allowing for the entry and exit of firms partially mitigates 
potential selection and survivorship bias. The vast majority of firms in the dataset are not traded 
in the stock market. This is an appealing characteristic because those firms are most likely to 
suffer from higher levels of information asymmetry. As such, they benefit more from extending 
trade credit, which allows them to enhance demand for their products and to attract new 
customers (Emery, 1987).  
 
2.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our analysis. We report means 
and standard deviations for the whole sample (column 1), for crisis and non-crisis periods 
(columns 2 and 3)14, and for differentiated and standardized sectors (column 5 and 6)15. We 
present p-values for the tests of equality of means with unequal variances across relevant 
groups of firms in columns 4 and 7.  
Column 1 shows that the average ratio of accounts receivable to sales (TD) for firms in our 
sample is 28.0%. This is similar to the corresponding figure in Mateut et al. (2015), which 
 
11
 Luxembourg is excluded due to missing sales data. 
12 Following Blundell et al. (1992) and based on a two-digit NACE classification, we group firms into the 
following industrial sectors: metal and metal goods; other minerals and mineral products; chemical and man-made 
fibres; mechanical engineering; electrical and instrument engineering; motor vehicles and parts; other transport 
equipment; food, drink, and tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear; and other. 
13 See Appendix A for details about our sample selection criteria. Appendix E presents details about the structure 
of the panel, and Appendix F presents the correlation matrix. 
14
 Following Becker and Ivashina (2018) and Fernandes et al. (2019), we define the crisis years as 2010 and 2011. 
These two years can be considered as the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis. Several authors, such as, for 
instance, Acharya et al. (2018), also included 2012 within the sovereign debt crisis period. Our main results were 
robust to redefining the crisis so as to also include 2012. Furthermore, to avoid overlap between “normal times” 
and the financial crisis period, we also checked the robustness of our findings to including the years 2007-09 
within the crisis dummy. The results based on these different definitions of the crisis are reported and discussed 
in Section 6.1. 
15 See Appendix D for details of which industrial sectors are classified as differentiated/standardized. 
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sampled French manufacturing firms (21.2%), but it is higher than the figures that Bougheas 
et al. (2009) and Guariglia and Mateut (2016) obtain for the UK and China, respectively.16  
From columns 2 and 3, we notice that the average trade credit extended to sales ratio is 
higher during the sovereign debt crisis compared to non-crisis years. During crisis periods, 
firms with better access to credit likely redistribute capital via trade credit to their customers 
(Choi and Kim, 2005; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013)17. Moreover, the ratio 
of inventories to sales is lower during the turmoil, which is in line with Nikolov (2013). Taken 
together, these statistics are consistent with the view that during crisis periods, firms decrease 
inventories by channelling funds to financially constrained customers. 
Considering other firm-specific characteristics, we observe that during the sovereign debt 
crisis years, firms report lower profitability and pledge smaller amounts of collateral. Firms 
also show higher ratios of short-term debt to sales during those times. This is driven by a decline 
in sales. The differences between the aforementioned indicators during and outside the crisis 
period are statistically significant at conventional levels (column 4).  
Focusing on the sectors in which firms operate, we note that on average firms in the 
differentiated sector sell on credit more than manufacturers producing standardized goods do 
(column 5 and 6). This can be explained bearing in mind that producers of specialised goods 
have fewer alternative customers, and, as a result, have a stronger incentive to generate sales 
by offering trade credit (Mateut et al., 2015). Furthermore, firms selling differentiated goods 
are smaller, younger, more liquid, and more profitable. These differences between relevant 
indicators within the standardized and differentiated subsamples are statistically significant in 
all cases (column 7). 
Overall, the aforementioned preliminary statistics suggest that extending trade credit may 
be related to inventory levels, the sovereign debt crisis, and the nature of the transacted goods. 
 
16 Bougheas et al. (2009) and Guariglia and Mateut (2016) find that the average ratio of accounts receivable to 
sales is 17.0% and 17.2%, respectively. The difference between our figures and theirs is probably due to the fact 
that we focus on euro-area countries, whilst they focus on the UK and China, respectively. Moreover, our study 
is based on the period 2006-2015, while they focus on 1993-2003 and 2000-2007, respectively. 
17
 Figure 2 graphs the annual average standardized (z-score) level of accounts receivable for non-financial 
corporations in our sample over the period 2006-2015. This is calculated subtracting the sample’s overall average 
accounts receivable from the average accounts receivable for each country and dividing the result by the standard 
deviation of overall accounts receivable. In line with the descriptive statistics in columns 2 and 3 of table 1, we 
see that accounts receivable grow significantly at the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis and then begins 
contracting in 2012. During the crisis period, bank-lending constraints and credit rationing likely increased firms’ 
demand for trade credit in the euro area (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009; Ferrando and Mulier, 2013; Casey and 
O’Toole, 2014).  
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In the following sections, we provide a formal econometric analysis on the links among these 
variables. 
 
3. Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
 
3.1 Trade credit and inventories 
A vast theoretical and empirical literature shows that trade credit is one of the most important 
sources of short-term financing for firms, irrespective of their size (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Giannetti et al., 2011; Ferrando and Mulier, 2013; Casey and O’Toole, 2014). Daripa and 
Nilsen (2011) and Bougheas et al. (2009) advocate that extending trade credit is related to 
inventory management.18 In particular, firms produce goods for sale. If firms do not sell the 
goods, they retain the inventory at a cost. Bearing in mind that the demand for their products 
is uncertain, producers have an incentive to provide credit to financially constrained customers 
in order to boost sales and to avoid holding costly inventories of finished goods. This is known 
as the inventory-management motive for sales on credit. Extending credit boosts sales and 
decreases the cost of holding inventories. Bougheas et al. (2009) and Guariglia and Mateut 
(2016) find evidence of the inventory-management motive in the UK and China, respectively. 
We anticipate a similar inventory-management motive for euro-area firms. Hence, our first 
testable hypothesis is: 
 
H1: There is a negative association between trade credit extended and inventories. 
 
3.2 The role of extreme economic events 
Several studies in the past two decades investigate the use of trade credit across periods of tight 
and loose monetary policy. The financial-accelerator theory motivates this line of inquiry 
according to which periods of monetary contraction increase financing costs and weaken 
balance sheets (Bernanke et al., 1996). Theoretical research predicts that when access to 
external financing is unrestricted, firms finance investment projects using bank credit (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994; Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Yet, when bank 
lending is insufficient to fund their operations, firms resort to trade credit. From an empirical 
 
18   The theoretical models in Bougheas et al. (2009) and Daripa and Nilsen (2011) are complementary. The former 
is a storage-cost model, in which the supplier faces a stochastic demand. The supplier needs to extend trade credit 
only to meet its financial obligations. In the latter study, it is the downstream customer who faces stochastic 
demand. 
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point of view, trade credit has been found to increase during periods of tight monetary policy 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Nilsen, 2002; Choi and Kim, 2005).  
How the recent global financial crisis affected trade credit is less clear-cut. For instance, 
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) show that larger US firms extended more 
trade credit to financially constrained counterparts during the global financial crisis. Yet, 
focusing on a sample of Dutch firms, Kabir and Zubair (2015) demonstrate that trade credit 
decreased during the crisis. 
Recent literature focuses on trade credit among firms more and less likely to face liquidity 
constraints. For instance, Casey and O’Toole (2014) show that during the global financial 
crisis, financially constrained firms in the euro area used more trade credit as an alternative to 
bank lending than their unconstrained counterparts did. Using a sample of Spanish SMEs, 
Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) also show that financially constrained firms depended heavily on 
trade credit during the recent crisis. In summary, this literature argues that financially 
constrained firms rely more on trade credit during bad economic times. 
The European sovereign debt crisis led to a significant contraction in bank loan supply, 
with implications for firms’ real decisions (Acharya et al., 2018; Farinha et al., 2019). Evidence 
also suggests that loan costs increased, which had dire effects on firms’ employment decisions, 
especially for firms in the periphery of European economies.19 As a result, during this period, 
credit-rationed firms used trade credit as an alternative source of financing (Casey and 
O’Toole, 2014).  
In light of these arguments, we expect firms in the euro area to face a higher incentive to 
offer trade credit during the sovereign debt crisis, due to the increased uncertainty in the 
demand for their products20. At the same time, we expect their financially constrained 
customers to face a contraction of credit supply from banks, which encourages the search for 
alternative sources of financing. As a result, the inventory-management motive should be 
stronger during the sovereign debt crisis. This leads to our next hypothesis, which is:  
 
 
19
 Previous studies (Bris et al., 2008; Afonso et al., 2014; Fernandes et al., 2019) classify Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain as periphery economies, and Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands as non-periphery countries. 
20 We verified whether the sovereign debt crisis was indeed associated with an increase in uncertainty by 
constructing a firm-specific measure of uncertainty based on sales. Specifically, following previous literature 
(Caglayan et al., 2012; Byrne et al., 2016), we estimated an AR(1) model of sales augmented with time, country, 
and industry-specific dummies. We then computed uncertainty as the three-year moving standard deviation of the 
unpredictable part of firms’ total real sales. In figure 3, we plot the average values of firm-specific uncertainty per 
year. The figure shows a significant increase in uncertainty associated with the sovereign debt crisis.  
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H2: The negative association between trade credit extended and inventories is stronger during 
the sovereign debt crisis.  
 
4. Empirical implementation and methodology 
 
4.1 Baseline specification 
Our baseline model follows Giannetti et al. (2011) and takes into account the inventory-
management motive in Bougheas et al. (2009). It takes the following form: 
  ܶܦ𝒾𝓉 = ∝௜+ 𝛽ଵܶܦ𝒾𝓉−ଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝐴݃݁𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଷܵ𝑖ݖ݁𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ସܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ହܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈𝒾𝓉 +                                                             +𝛽଺𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽଻𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽଼𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ𝒾𝓉 +                                                                                                    +𝜑௜ + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑௝ + 𝜑௝𝑡 + 𝜑𝑐 + ℯ𝒾𝓉                 (1) 
 
where, i = 1, 2, ...N, indexes firms and t = 1, 2, ...T, indexes years. ܶܦ𝒾𝓉 is the dependent 
variable, measured as accounts receivable over sales. Our main variable of interest is ܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉, 
which is defined as the ratio of inventory stock to sales, and accounts for the effect of holding 
costly stocks of inventories. Our first aim is to investigate whether there is a trade-off between 
inventories and trade credit extended. A negative 𝛽ସ supports H1, implying a trade-off between 
inventories and trade credit extended. 
We also add controls for various firm-specific characteristics that influence the 
extension of trade credit.21 We include 𝐴݃݁𝒾𝓉, which is the logarithm of the difference between 
the present year and the firm’s date of incorporation, to control for track record. The literature 
widely accepts that younger firms lacking a track record are more likely to bear credit 
constraints (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), making them less likely to extend trade credit. As a 
result, we expect age to be positively related with trade credit extended. 
Following Bougheas et al. (2009), we include ܵ𝑖ݖ݁𝒾𝓉, which is the logarithm of real 
total assets. We expect larger (smaller) firms should provide more (less) trade credit to their 
business partners (Bougheas et al., 2009). Next, we control for firms’ borrowing capacity by 
including ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈𝒾𝓉, which is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Previous studies 
show that firms with higher asset tangibility, and therefore higher borrowing capacity, tend to 
extend less credit to other firms because they operate in industries with lower growth potential 
 
21 See Appendix C for detailed definitions of all the variables in our data set included in our models. 
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(Hovakimian, 2009; Giannetti et al., 2011). Hence, we expect a negative relationship between 
collateral and the extension of trade credit. 
We also include 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ𝒾𝓉, which is operating profit (or loss) divided by total sales. 
More profitable firms are more likely to channel their earnings toward accounts receivable 
(Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). As a result, we expect firms’ profitability to be positively 
associated with accounts receivable.  𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡, measured as cash and equivalents to total sales, captures firms’ gross 
liquid assets (cash, bank deposits, and other current assets excluding inventories and accounts 
receivable). In line with Petersen and Rajan (1997), Mateut et al. (2015), and Guariglia and 
Mateut (2016), we expect liquidity to be negatively associated with the volume of sales on 
credit. This can be explained considering that a firm with low liquidity may be better off 
increasing its credit sales by extending trade credit to customers rather than not selling at all. 
We capture access to bank credit using 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡, which is short-term debt to total sales. 
According to Bougheas et al. (2009) and Mateut et al. (2015), bank loans complement accounts 
receivable.22 In line with their work, we expect a positive association between bank loans and 
the extension of trade credit.  
Finally, the error term has four components: 𝜑௜ is a firm-specific component, 𝜑𝑡 is a 
time-specific component accounting for business cycle effects, 𝜑௝ is an industry-specific 
component accounting for industry dynamics, 𝜑௝𝑡 is an industry-specific component that varies 
across time and accounts for industry-specific shifts across time periods, 𝜑𝑐 is a country-
specific dummy, and 𝜖௜𝑡 is an indiosyncratic component. We control for 𝜑௜ by estimating our 
equations in first differences; for 𝜑𝑡, by including time dummies; for 𝜑௝, by including industry 
dummies; for 𝜑𝑐, by including country dummies; and for 𝜑௝𝑡, by including time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies in all our specifications.  
 
4.2 Accounting for the sovereign debt crisis 
We next investigate how the trade-off between inventories and trade credit extended varies in 
and out of the sovereign debt crisi years. To this end, we augment equation (1) with a sovereign 
debt crisis dummy (ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡) and an interaction term between ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 and ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡. The crisis 
dummy equals 1 over the period 2010-2011, and 0 otherwise. The remaining control variables 
and fixed effects remain unchanged. The model takes the following form: 
 
22 See Atanasova (2012) for a detailed analysis regarding substitutability and complementarity between bank loans 
and trade credit extended. 
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 ܶܦ𝒾𝓉 = ∝௜+ 𝛽ଵܶܦ𝒾𝓉−ଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝐴݃݁𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଷܵ𝑖ݖ݁𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ସܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ହܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡+𝛽଺ܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉 ∗ ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝓉 +                                                               + 𝛽଻ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈𝒾𝓉  + 𝛽଼𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଽ𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଵ଴𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ𝒾𝓉 +                                                                                                                           +𝜑௜ + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑௝ + 𝜑௝𝑡 + 𝜑𝑐 + ℯ𝒾𝓉       (2) 
 𝛽ସ measures the association between inventory stocks and trade credit extended outside  the 
sovereign debt crisis period. The corresponding association during the crisis period is the sum 
of 𝛽ସ and 𝛽଺. To support H2, we should observe negative 𝛽ସ and 𝛽଺ coefficients. This would 
imply that trade credit extended and the stock of inventories are negatively related, but more 
so during the sovererign debt crisis.  
 
4.3 Estimation methodology 
We estimate all our models using the system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The 
main advantage of the GMM estimator is that it takes into account unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity, as well as the possible endogeneity and mismeasurement problems of the 
regressors (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The estimator combines in a 
system the relevant equation in first-difference and in levels. It makes use of values of the 
regressors lagged twice or more as instruments in the differenced equation, as well as of 
differences of the regressors lagged once in the levels equation. We treat all the regressors in 
our equations (with the exception of age and the crisis dummy) as endogenous and instrument 
them using their lagged levels in the differenced equation, as well as their lagged differences 
in the levels equation23.  
To evaluate whether our instruments are legitimate and whether our models are 
correctly specified, we first use the Sargan test (also known as the J test) to test for 
overidentifying restrictions. Under the null of instrument validity, it is asymptotically 
distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the 
 
23 In Appendix G, we provide estimates of equation (1) obtained using the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), 
the fixed effects (FE) estimator, and the first-difference (FD) GMM estimator for comparison. The coefficient 
associated with the lagged dependent variable from the pooled OLS (FE) estimator is upward- (downward-) biased 
in a dynamic panel model (Bond et al., 2001). If the same coefficient estimated using the FD GMM lies close to 
or below the fixed-effects estimates, one could suspect the FD GMM estimate is downward-biased as well, 
possibly due to weak instruments. In this case, the system GMM is required (Bond et al., 2001). The estimates 
reported in Appendix G show that the FD GMM coefficient is indeed smaller than the FE coefficient. This justifies 
our use of system-GMM as our preferred estimator.  
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number of parameters24. Our second criterion is based on the nth-order serial correlation in the 
differenced residuals. In the presence of serial correlation of order 2 in the differenced 
residuals, the instrument set needs to be restricted to lags 3 and deeper.The latter instruments 
are valid in the absence of serial correlation of order 3 in the differenced residuals. We assess 
the presence of nth order serial correlation in the differenced residuals by using the AR(n) test, 
which is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no nth order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals (Roodman, 2009).  
 
5. Main results 
 
5.1 Is there an inventory management motive? 
We begin our enquiry by estimating equation (1), which aims at assessessing whether a trade-
off between inventories and trade credit exists. Column 1 of table 2 presents the baseline 
results. We observe that the coefficient associated with the stock of inventories (ܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉) is 
negative and statistically significant. The association between inventories and trade credit 
extended is also economically important. Elasticities evaluated at sample means suggest that a 
10% lower stock of inventories (relative to sales) is associated with a 0.99% higher ratio of 
accounts receivable to sales, which is a sizeable effect.25 This is consistent with our first 
hypothesis (H1), according to which, when product demand is uncertain, firms have an 
incentive to minimize inventory costs by selling on credit. Hence, in line with the empirical 
evidence in Bougheas et al. (2009) for the UK, we confirm the importance of the inventory-
management motive for  euro-area firms.26 
With the exception of age (𝐴݃݁𝒾𝓉), the control variables in the regression model carry 
statistically significant coefficients at least at the 10% level. We can rationalize their signs on 
the basis of existing theoretical models and empirical evidence (Bougheas et al., 2009; Gianneti 
et al., 2011). Larger firms tend to sell more on credit than smaller ones, as indicated by the 
positive coefficient associated with ܵ𝑖ݖ݁𝒾𝓉. Collateral (ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈𝒾𝓉) is negatively linked to 
the extension of trade credit. The intuition for this effect is that firms with higher asset 
 
24 Using Monte Carlo experiments, Blundell et al. (2001) demonstrate that the Sargan test tends to over-reject the 
null hypothesis of valid instruments for the system GMM, especially for large samples. Chen and Guariglia (2013) 
and Fernandes et al. (2019) confirm this finding using a large panel of Chinese and European firms, respectively. 
25 We use the following formula to calculate elasticities: (coefficient on ܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉*mean value of ܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉)/ mean 
value of ܶܦ𝒾𝓉 . 
26
 Appendix H reports separate regressions for each country in our sample. All countries show a negative and 
significant coefficient associated with the inventory variable. 
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tangibility are less likely to extend trade credit, because they tend to operate in less dynamic 
industries with lower growth potential (Hovakimian, 2009). The positive coefficient associated 
with profit (𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ𝒾𝓉) shows that profitable firms are more likely to extend trade credit. This 
is consistent with the theoretical model and empirical evidence in Bougheas et al. (2009). 
Liquidity (𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ𝒾𝓉) is negatively associated with the extension of trade credit, indicating 
that less liquid firms extend more trade credit. Because trade credit extension is a way to boost 
sales, a firm with low liquidity may be better off increasing its credit sales as opposed to not 
selling at all (Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). The positive sign associated with bank loans 
(𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ𝒾𝓉ሻ reveals that when more external funding is available, firms extend more trade credit 
to their buyers. This is consistent with Bougheas et al.’s (2009) argument, according to which 
accounts receivable complement bank loans. Finally, the autoregressive coefficient (ܶܦ𝒾𝓉−ଵ) 
is highly significant and indicates a relatively low persistence in the extension of trade credit.  
The diagnostic tests do not generally indicate problems with the choice of instruments 
and the specification of our model. The Sargan tests suggests the adequacy of the instruments, 
and there is no sign of second-order serial correlation in the error term of the first-differenced 
equation. 
 
5.2 The role of the sovereign debt crisis 
We next investigate whether the negative association between the stock of inventories and the 
extension of trade credit in the euro area strengthens during the sovereign debt crisis period. 
To this end, we estimate equation (2), which is equivalent to the baseline model augmented 
with two additional variables: an interaction between the stock of inventories and the sovereign 
debt crisis dummy (ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 ∗ ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡), as well as the crisis dummy not interacted. Through the 
former, our goal is to assess how the 2010-2011 crisis affects the inventory-management 
motive. Through the latter, we examine whether the extension of trade credit shifts during the 
crisis. The results are in column 2 of table 2.  
We observe that, once again, the coefficient associated with ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 is negative and 
statistically significant. Furthermore, in line with our second hypothesis (H2), the coefficient 
associated with the interaction between the stock of inventories and the crisis dummy is also 
negative and significant. Hence, the negative trade-off between inventories and extensions of 
trade credit becomes stronger during the crisis.27  
 
27
 Appendix I reports separate regressions for each country in our sample. All countries show a negative and 
significant coefficient associated with both the Stock variable and its interaction with the Crisis dummy. 
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To assess the economic importance of the crisis, we focus on the coefficients on the 
interaction term (ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 ∗ ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡) and the stock of inventories (ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡). Elasticities 
evaluated at sample means show that a 10% lower inventory to sales ratio is associated with a 
2.45% [((-0.123-0.315)*0.160)/0.278] higher accounts receivable to sales ratio during the 
crisis, but only a 0.70% [(-0.123*0.160)/0.278] higher ratio outside of the turmoil period. This 
reinforces the idea that during a crisis, as a result of higher demand uncertainty, firms face 
more incentives to sell their inventories on credit to boost sales. 
Table 2 also shows that the coefficient associated with the Crisis dummy is positive 
and highly significant. This suggests that during the sovereign debt crisis, firms extended more 
trade credit to custmers. Considering that firms experienced increased financial difficulties 
during the crisis (Draghi, 2014), this is consistent with the idea that suppliers support customers 
that experience temporary financial difficulties, as they have an interest in their customers’ 
survival (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Cunat, 2007). This is also in line with previous empirical 
studies showing that trade credit increased in the euro area during the financial crisis (Casey 
and O’Toole, 2014; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016).   
The other control variables generally behave as conjectured. Furthermore, the 
diagnostic tests do not indicate any problems with the specification of the model or the choice 
of instruments. 
 
5.3 Additional results 
 
5.3.1 Does the nature of the traded goods (standardized versus differentiated) make a 
difference? 
Our estimates so far highlight that the sovereign debt crisis intensifies the trade-off between 
inventory and the extension of trade credit. We next examine whether the link varies according 
to the characteristics of the transacted goods. The motivation behind this exercise stems from 
the diversion-value hypothesis in Giannetti et al. (2011). Building on the diversion theory in 
Burkhart and Ellingsen (2004), these authors associate trade credit extended with the nature of 
the goods traded. In particular, suppliers of trade credit have an advantage relative to banks in 
financing their customers because repossessed goods are worth more to suppliers than to banks. 
This advantage is stronger for firms in differentiated industries than for those in standardized 
sectors. Firms in the former industries produce more specific products that are hard to replace 
due to their unique and customized inputs. As a result, the seller-buyer relationship is tighter  
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(Guariglia and Mateut, 2016). In this scenario, switching costs are higher and buyers are less 
tempted to end relationships with suppliers or default on them (Cunat, 2007). As they have 
fewer alternative customers, we expect producers of specialized goods to show higher 
incentives to generate sales by offering trade credit in order to reduce their inventory costs.  
           To assess whether this is the case, we estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for firms 
operating in standardized and differentiated industries. The results are presented in table 3. 
Columns 1 and 3 refer to firms operating in differentiated industries, whilst columns 3 and 4 
refer to firms in standardised industries. Focusing on columns 1 and 2, we can see that the 
coefficient associated with ܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉   is only significant for firms operating in the differentiated 
sector. In other words, the trade-off between inventories and the extension of trade credit is 
only apparent for firms producing differentiated goods. Furthermore, in column 3, both the 
coefficient associated with ܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉  and that associated with the inteteraction between the stock 
of inventories and the crisis are negative and significant, whilst the corresponding coefficients 
in column 4 are not significant. This indicates that that the negative relationship between 
inventories and the extension of trade credit observed for firms in differentiated sectors is 
stronger during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we also observe a positive coefficient 
associated with the crisis dummy in column 3, whilst the corresponding coefficient in column 
4 is not significant. This suggests that only firms in the differentiated sector are able to extend 
more trade credit during the crisis period.  
 
5.3.2 The role of financial development 
As an economy becomes more financially developed in terms of banking, low-cost credit 
becomes readily available to both suppliers and customers (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), thereby 
decreasing the demand for trade credit. Suppliers’ incentive to extend trade credit to their 
customers will therefore be reduced, and, consequently, the incentive for firms to reduce their 
stocks of inventories by extending more trade credit may also be weakened.  
To test whether this is the case, we first augment the baseline model with a country-
specific, time-varying variable reflecting the development of the banking system in the country 
where the firm operates (FDct). We use two proxies for financial devlopment: the ratio of 
private bank credit to GDP and the ratio of bank assets to GDP (Beck et al., 2000; Levine, 
2006; Baltagi et al., 2008)28. We include this variable to assess the direct effect of financial 
 
28
 Following Beck et al. (2003), our financial-development data for various countries are taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI, November 2017). 
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development on the extension of trade credit. At the same time, we add an interaction between 
the stock of inventories and financial development. This term enables us to examine the extent 
to which financial development affects the inventory-management motive. The new model that 
we estimate takes the following form: 
 ܶܦ𝒾𝓉 = ∝௜+ 𝛽ଵܶܦ𝒾𝓉−ଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝐴݃݁𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଷܵ𝑖ݖ݁𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ସܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉+𝛽ହܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉 ∗ 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝓉 + 𝛽଺𝐹ܦ𝑐𝓉                                                                + 𝛽଻ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈𝒾𝓉  + 𝛽଼𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଽ𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଵ଴𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ𝒾𝓉 +                                                                                                                           +𝜑௜ + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑௝ + 𝜑௝𝑡 + 𝜑𝑐 + ℯ𝒾𝓉       (3) 
 
The results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of table 4. We observe that the coefficient 
associated with the financial development variable is not statistically significant, which 
suggests that financial development does not directly affect the extension of trade credit. Yet, 
the coefficient associated with the interaction between inventories and financial development 
is positive and significant, regardless of how we measure financial development.  Specifically, 
focusing on column 1, which uses the ratio of private bank credit to GDP as a measure of 
financial development, a 10% lower stock of inventories for a firm in a country at the 25th 
percentile of the financial development distribution (0.879) is associated with a 1.38% higher 
ratio of trade credit extended to sales29. The corresponding figure for a country at the 75th 
percentile of financial development (0.966) is 0.88%30. Focusing on column 2, which measures 
financial development as the ratio of bank assets to GDP, a 10% lower stock of inventories for 
a firm in a country at the 25th percentile of financial development (1.121) is associated with a 
1.67% higher ratio of trade credit extended to sales. The corresponding figure for a country at 
the 75th percentile (1.330) is 1.25%. This suggests that the inventory-management motive is 
weaker the higher the financial development characterizing the country where the firm 
operates. This is consistent with the view that in countries with higher financial development, 
where it is easier for companies to access cheaper bank credit, it may be more difficult for firms 
to reduce their stocks of inventories by extending more trade credit. 
We next estimate an equation similar to the previous one, which takes the crisis into 
account by adding the crisis dummy, together with the following interaction terms: 
(Stockit*Crisist), (Crisist*FDct), and  (Stockit*Crisist*FDct). The latter interaction enables us to 
 
29
 This figure is obtained as follows:{[10*[[-0.435+(0.219*0.879)]*0.159]/0.280}. 
30 For both measures of FD, countries at the 25th percentile are Austria, Belgium, and Finland, while countries at 
the 75th percentile are Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. 
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test whether the association between inventories and accounts receivable during the crisis 
period also weakens for countries with higher levels of financial development. The new model 
takes the following form: 
 ܶܦ𝒾𝓉 = ∝௜+ 𝛽ଵܶܦ𝒾𝓉−ଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝐴݃݁𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଷܵ𝑖ݖ݁𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ସܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉+𝛽ହܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉 ∗ 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝓉 + +𝛽଺ܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉 ∗ ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝓉 ∗ 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝓉 + 𝛽଻ܵݐ݋ܿ݇𝒾𝓉 ∗ ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝓉 + 𝛽଼𝐹ܦ𝑐𝓉 ∗ ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝓉 + 𝛽ଽܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝓉 +                                                            +𝛽ଵ଴𝐹ܦ𝑐𝓉 + 𝛽ଵଵܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈𝒾𝓉  + 𝛽ଵଶ𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଵଷ𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ𝒾𝓉 + 𝛽ଵସ𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ𝒾𝓉 +                                                                                                                           +𝜑௜ + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑௝ + 𝜑௝𝑡 + 𝜑𝑐 + ℯ𝒾𝓉       (4) 
 
The estimates are reported in columns 3 and 4 of table 4. First, we observe that, once 
again, financial development does not have a direct impact on trade credit extension. Next, the 
coefficient associated with the crisis dummy is positive and significant, whilst the coefficient 
associated with the interaction between the crisis dummy and FD is negative and significant. 
This confirms our previous finding that there is a higher incentive to extend trade credit during 
crises periods, which, is, however, attenuated in countries with higher financial development. 
Furthermore, in line with previous findings, the negative and significant coefficient associated 
with Stockit*Crisist indicates that the inventory management motive is magnified during the 
crisis. Finally, the positive and significant coefficients associated with Stockit*FDct and 
Stockit*Crisist*FDct indicate that financial development attenuates the inventory management 
motive in all periods, but more so in crisis periods. 
 
6. Robustness checks 
 
6.1 Using different definitions of the crisis 
Our dataset spans the years 2007-2015. So far, as in Becker and Ivashina (2018) and Fernandes 
et al. (2019), we have only considered 2010-2011 as sovereign debt crisis years. The argument 
is that this was the peak crisis period. Moreover, following Mario Draghi’s announcement in 
July 2012 that the ECB was ready to do whatever it took to preserve the euro, and after the 
resulting decline in sovereign borrowing costs, the European debt crisis largely ended. Yet, the 
first half of 2012 was characterised by a restructuring of debt in Greece (March/April 2012) as 
well as yields on Italian and Spanish government bonds reaching levels normally considered 
unsustainable, which led to Draghi’s announcement (Ferrando et al., 2017; Fernandes et al., 
2019). Hence, 2012 could also be seen as part of the sovereign debt crisis. Some authors indeed 
include 2012 within the sovereign debt crisis years (e.g. Ferrando et al., 2017; Archaya et al., 
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2018). We therefore verify whether our main results are robust to redefining the Crisis 
including 2012. We report estimates of Equation (2) based on this new definition of the crisis 
in column 1 of table 5. The results suggest that there is still evidence of a trade-off between the 
stock of inventories and accounts receivable, which is amplified during the crisis. Yet, both 
this amplification effect and the direct effect of the crisis on the extension of trade credit are 
weaker than those reported in column 2 of table 2. This may be explained considering that only 
the first half of 2012 was in fact a crisis period. 
Furthermore, our dataset encompasses not only the European sovereign debt crisis, but 
also the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. We therefore verify whether our main results are 
robust to using a broader measure of the crisis, which includes both the sovereign debt crisis 
and the financial crisis years. To this end, we create a new Crisis dummy equal to 1 in the years 
2007 to 2011, and 0 otherwise, and re-estimate Equation (2). The results are reported in column 
2 of table 5. Once again, we observe evidence in favour of a trade-off between the stock of 
inventories and trade credit extended, which is magnified over the crisis years. Moreover, the 
positive and significant coefficient associated with the crisis dummy confirms that trade credit 
extended rises during turbulent periods. We find similar results in column 3 of table 5, where 
the Crisis dummy is set equal to one in the years 2007-2012, and 0 otherwise.  
 
6.2 Accounting for country heterogeneity  
Differences across euro-area countries may influence the trade-off between extended trade 
credit and the stock of inventories. Although in our empirical specifications, we include country 
fixed effects to control for country-specific differences, we strenghten our identification by 
splitting the sample according to countries’ legal origin. Previous literature links the usage of 
trade credit with the rule of law, defined by La Porta et al. (1998). The idea is that bank credit 
is less prevalent in countries with weaker creditor protection (i.e. countries based on French 
civil law), where financial contracts are less likely to be enforcable (Burkart and Ellingsen, 
2004; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). In line with this argument, Ferrando and Mulier 
(2013) show that trade credit usage is more important than bank lending in countries based on 
French civil law. We therefore expect a stronger inventory-management motive in these 
countries. To test whether this is the case, we estimate our main models on two samples, namely 
countries based on French civil law and other countries. 31  The results are in table 6. Columns 
1 and 2 (3 and 4) report estimates of equation (1) (equation 2), respectively, for countries based 
 
31 Countries based on French civil law are Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
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on French civil law and other countries. We can see that the inventory-management motive is 
statistically significant and stronger during the sovereign debt crisis only for firms based in 
countries that use French civil law.  
 
6.3 Using alternative definitions of trade credit extended  
Finally, we check whether our main results are robust to using alternative measures of trade 
credit extended. First, following Cerqueiro (2011) and Guariglia and Mateut (2016), we define 
trade credit as the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets.32 Column 1 of table 7 reports 
estimates of equation (1) based on this new definition of trade credit, and column 2 reports 
estimates of equation (2). We continue to observe a trade-off between inventory and extended 
trade credit, which is stronger during the crisis.  
We next argue that managers should use both channels of trade credit (extended and 
taken) when deciding to generate profits via inventory management (Chod, 2017). To test 
whether this is the case, we explore whether the trade-off between inventories and accounts 
receivable also holds for net trade credit (defined as the difference between trade credit 
extended and trade credit received scaled by total sales). The empirical findings in table 7 
suggest there is a trade-off between inventories and net trade credit (column 3), which is 
stronger during the sovereign debt crisis (column 4). In summary, our results are robust to using 
different definitions of trade credit.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines two key hypotheses related to the link between inventories and trade credit 
in the euro area, and the role of the European sovereign debt crisis. Specifically, according to 
the inventory-management motive, firms shoud prefer to extend trade credit as opposed to 
holding on to costly inventories. This link is expected to be stronger during crisis periods when 
demand uncertainty heightens and bank lending dries up, hence increasing the demand for 
alternative sources of external funding.   
       Our results, based on a multicountry data-set covering 72,172 euro-area firms over the 
period 2006-2015, support these hypotheses by providing evidence of a negative relationship 
between inventories and the extension of trade credit, which  becomes stronger during the 
 
32 Also see Fisman and Love (2003) and Cunat (2007) for a discussion of why it it may be appropriate to deflate trade credit 
by total assets. 
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European sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2011. The trade-off is mainly prevalent among firms 
selling differentiated goods, especially during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, we find 
that higher levels of financial intermediation weaken the inverse relationship between 
inventories and sales on credit, particularly in crisis periods. A likely reason for this is that in 
countries with a higher level of financial intermediation, the financial system is able to provide 
low-cost credit to firms, thereby decreasing the demand for trade credit. In summary, to fully 
explain why firms extend trade credit, beyond the inventory management motive, we should 
also consider the role of financial crises, the nature of the goods sold, and the underlying level 
of financial development.   
           Our findings have important insights for financial managers in their day-to-day business 
operations, as well as for policymakers. They highlight the important “lender of last resort” 
role that firms play as liquidity providers, particularly during financial crises. Given the 
traditionally strong dependence of euro area firms on bank lending (European Commission, 
2013), and the increased level of fragmentation in the European banking system during the 
recent sovereign debt crisis (ECB, 2018; Gabrieli and Labonne, 2018), the role of trade credit 
was vital to maintain supply chains and reduce the potential economic fallout. Thus, we agree 
with Casey and O’Toole (2014) who reinforce the need of a more diverse financing 
environment for European firms. 
 
Declaration of interest: none 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank Simona Mateut, as well as participants at the 2018 Forecasting 
Financial Markets conference, the 2019 Quantitative Finance and Risk Analysis Symposium, 
the 2019 meetings of the European Economic Association, and the 2019 Annual Conference 
of the Multinational Finance Society for useful comments. 
 
Supplementary material: Supplementary material can be found in the online Appendix. 
Appendix A presents details about our sample selection steps. Appendix B presents descriptive 
statistics for accounts receivable, sales, and inventories by country. Appendix C contains 
definitions of our main variables. Appendix D presents our industrial classification based on 
the characteristics of the goods produced. Appendix E provides the structure of our panel. 
Appendix F contains the correlation matrix. Appendix G presents the OLS, fixed effects, and 
first-difference GMM estimates of equation (1). Appendixes H and I respectively contain 
estimates of Equation (1) and Equation (2) for each of the countries in our sample. 
21 
 
 
References  
Acharya, V.V., Eisert, T., Eufinger, C. and Hirsch, C. (2018), Real effects of the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe: Evidence from syndicated loans, The Review of Financial Studies 31, 2855–
2896. 
Acharya, V.V. and Steffen, S. (2014), Benchmarking the European Central Bank’s asset quality 
review and stress test: A tale of two leverage ratios. Brussels: Center for European Policy 
Studies. 
Afonso, A., Arghyrou, M. G. and Kontonikas, A. (2014), Pricing sovereign bond risk in the 
European monetary union area: An empirical investigation, International Journal of Finance 
and Economics 19, 49–54. 
Alter, A. and Schüler, Y.S. (2012), Credit spread interdependencies of European states and 
banks during the financial crisis, Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 3444–3468. 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995), Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error components models, Journal of Econometrics 68, 29–51. 
Atanasova, C. (2012), How do firms choose between intermediary and supplier finance? 
Financial Management 41, 207–228. 
Baltagi, B., Demetriades, P. and Law, S. (2008), Financial development and openness: 
Evidence from panel data, Journal of Development Economics 89, 285–296. 
Beck, T., Levine, R. and Loayza, N. (2000), Finance and the sources of growth, Journal of 
Financial Economics 58, 261-300. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Levine, R. (2003), A new database on financial development 
and structure, Working Paper 2784, World Bank. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S. (1996), The financial accelerator and the flight to 
quality, Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 1–15. 
Biais, B. and Gollier, C. (1997), Trade credit and credit rationing, Review of Financial Studies 
10, 903–937. 
Bloom, N., Floetotto, M., Jaimovich, N., Saporta-Eksten, I. and Terry, S. (2018), Really 
uncertain business cycles, Econometrica 86, 1031–1065.  
Blundell, R., Bond S., Devereux, M. and Schiantarelli, F. (1992), Investment and Tobin’s Q: 
Evidence from company panel data, Journal of Econometrics 51, 233–257. 
 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998), Initial conditions and moment restriction in dynamic panel 
data models, Journal of Econometrics 87, 115–143. 
Blundell, R., Bond, S. and Windmeijer, F. (2001), Estimation in dynamic panel data models: 
22 
 
 
Improving on the performance of the standard GMM estimator, Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited 15, 53–91. 
 
Becker, B. and Ivashina, V. (2018), Financial repression in the European sovereign debt crisis, 
Review of Finance 22, 83-115. 
Blundell, R., Bond, S., Devereux, M. and Schiantarelli, F. (1992), Investment and Tobin's Q: 
Evidence from company panel data, Journal of Econometrics 51, 233-257. 
Bond, S., Hoeffler, A. and Temple, J. (2001), GMM estimation of empirical growth models. 
CEPR Discussion Paper no. 3048. 
Bougheas, S., Mateut, S. and Mizen, P. (2009), Corporate trade credit and inventories: New 
evidence of a trade-off from accounts payable and receivable, Journal of Banking and Finance 
33, 300–307. 
Brennan, M., Maksimovic, V. and Zechner, J. (1988), Vendor financing, The Journal of 
Finance 43, 1127–1141. 
Bris, A., Koskinen, Y. and Nilsson, M. (2008), The euro and corporate valuations, The Review 
of Financial Studies 22, 3171–3209. 
Burkhart, M. and Ellingsen, T. (2004), In-kind finance: A theory of trade credit, The American 
Economic Review 94, 556–590. 
Byrne, J.P., Spaliara, M.E. and Tsoukas, S. (2016), Firm survival, uncertainty, and financial 
frictions: Is there a financial uncertainty accelerator? Economic Inquiry 54, 375–390. 
Caglayan, M., Maioli, S. and Mateut, S. (2012), Inventories, sales uncertainty, and financial 
strength, Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 2512-2521. 
Carbó-Valverde, S., Rodriguez-Fernandez, F. and Udell, G. F. (2009), Bank market power and 
SME financing constraints, Review of Finance 13, 309–340. 
Carbó‐Valverde, S., Rodríguez‐Fernández, F. and Udell, G.F. (2016), Trade credit, the 
financial crisis, and SME access to finance, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48, 113–
143. 
Casey, E. and O’Toole, C. M. (2014), Bank lending constraints, trade credit and alternative 
financing during the financial crisis: Evidence from European SMEs, Journal of Corporate 
Finance 27, 173–193. 
Cerqueiro, G., Degryse, H. and Ongena, S. (2011), Rules versus discretion in loan rate 
setting, Journal of Financial Intermediation 20, 503–529. 
Chen, M. and Guariglia, A. (2013), Internal financial constraints and firm productivity in 
China: Do liquidity and export behavior make a difference? Journal of Comparative 
Economics 41, 1123–1140. 
23 
 
 
 
Chod, J. (2017), Inventory, risk shifting, and trade credit, Management Science 63, 3207–3225. 
 
Choi, W. G. and Kim, Y. (2005), Trade credit and the effect of macro-financial shocks: 
Evidence from US panel data, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40, 897–925. 
Cunat, V. (2007), Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers, The 
Review of Financial Studies 20, 491–527. 
Daripa, A. and Nilsen, J. (2011), Ensuring sales: A theory of trade credit, American Economic 
Journal: Microeconomics 3, 245–279. 
De Bruyckere, V., Gerhardt, M., Schepens, G. and Vander Vennet, R. (2013), Bank/sovereign 
risk spillovers in the European debt crisis, Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 4793–4809. 
Delatte, A. L., Fouquau, J. and Portes, R., (2017), Regime-dependent sovereign risk pricing 
during the euro crisis, Review of Finance 21, 363–385. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (2001), Firms as financial intermediaries: Evidence 
from trade credit data, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Number 2696. 
Draghi, M. (2014). Monetary policy in a prolonged period of low inflation, Speech byMr Mario 
Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at the ECB Forum on Central Banking, 
Sintra, Portugal, 26 May 2014. 
 
Emery, G.W. (1987). An optimal financial response to variable demand. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 22, 209–225.  
European Commission (2013), Green paper on long-term financing of the European economy, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013DC0150 
European Central Bank (2016), The impact of uncertainty on economic activity in the euro 
area, Policy report: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eb201608_article01.en.pdf  
European Central Bank (2018), Measuring fragmentation in the euro area unsecured overnight 
interbank money market: a monetary policy transmission approach, ECB Economic Bulletin, 
Issue 5/2018. 
Farinha, L, Spaliara, M-E. and Tsoukas, S. (2019), Bank shocks and firm performance: New 
evidence from the sovereign debt crisis, Journal of Financial Intermediation 40, 100818.  
Fernandes, F.D.S., Kontonikas, A. and Tsoukas, S. (2019), On the real effect of financial 
pressure: Evidence from firm‐level employment during the Euro‐area crisis, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics 81, 617–646. 
Ferrando, A. and Mulier, K. (2013), Do firms use the trade credit channel to manage growth? 
Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 3035–3046. 
 
24 
 
 
Ferrando, A., Popov, A. and Udell, G. F. (2017), Sovereign stress and SMEs’ access to finance: 
Evidence from the ECB's SAFE survey. Journal of Banking and Finance 81, 65–80. 
 
Fisman, R. and Love, I. (2003), Trade credit, financial intermediary development and industry 
growth, Journal of Finance 58, 353–374. 
 
Frank, M. and Maksimovic, V. (1998), Trade credit, collateral, and adverse selection, Working 
paper, University of Mariland, MIMEO. 
Gabrieli, S. and Labonne, C. (2018), Euro area interbank market fragmentation: New evidence 
on the roles of bad banks versus bad sovereigns, VOX Report, https://voxeu.org/article/euro-
area-interbank-market-fragmentation 
Garcia-Appendini, E. and Montoriol-Garriga, J. (2013), Firms as liquidity providers: Evidence 
from the 2007-2008 financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 109, 272–291. 
Giannetti, M., 2003. Do better institutions mitigate agency problems? Evidence from corporate 
finance choices, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 185-212. 
Giannetti, M., Burkart, M. and Ellingsen, T. (2011), What you sell is what you lend? Explaining 
trade credit contracts, Review of Financial Studies 24, 1261–1298. 
Guariglia, A. and Mateut, S. (2016), External finance and trade credit extension in China: Does 
political affiliation make a difference? The European Journal of Finance 22, 319–344. 
Guariglia, A., Spaliara, M. E. and Tsoukas, S. (2016), To what extent does the interest burden 
affect firm survival? Evidence from a panel of UK firms during the recent financial crisis, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 78, 576–594. 
Hadlock, C. and Pierce, J. (2010), New evidence on measuring financial constraints: Moving 
beyond the KZ index, Review of Financial Studies 23, 1909–1940. 
Hovakimian, G. (2009), Determinants of investment cash flow sensitivity, Financial 
Management 38, 161–183. 
Kabir, R. and Zubair, S. (2015), Trade credit as an alternative to bank finance during the 
financial crisis: Evidence from the Dutch SMEs, In 19th Annual European Conference of the 
Financial Management Association International (FMA) 2015. 
Kozeniauskas, N., Orlik, A. and Veldkamp, L. (2018), What are uncertainty shocks? Journal 
of Monetary Economics 100, 1–15. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1998), Law and finance, Journal 
of Political Economy 106, 1113–1155. 
Levine, R. (2006), Finance and growth: Theory and evidence. In: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S. (Eds.), 
Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 1. Elsevier Science, New York. 
25 
 
 
Long, M. S., Malitz, I. B. and Ravid, S. A. (1993), Trade credit quality guarantees and product 
marketability, Financial Management 22, 117–127. 
Love, I., Preve, L. A. and Sarria-Allende, V. (2007), Trade credit and bank credit: Evidence 
from recent financial crises, Journal of Financial Economics 83, 453–469. 
Mateut, S., Bougheas, S. and Mizen, P. (2006), Trade credit, bank lending and monetary policy 
transmission, European Economic Review 50, 603–629. 
Mateut, S., Mizen, P. and Ziane, Y. (2015), Inventory composition and trade credit, 
International Review of Financial Analysis 42, 434–446. 
Mateut, S. and Zanchettin, P., (2013), Credit sales and advance payments: Substitutes or 
complements? Economics Letters 118, 173-176. 
Mian, S. L. and Smith Jr, C. W. (1992), Accounts receivable management policy: theory and 
evidence, The Journal of Finance 47, 169-200. 
Ng, C. K., Smith, J. K. and Smith, R. L. (1999), Evidence on the determinants of credit terms 
used in interfirm trade, The Journal of Finance 54, 1109-1129. 
Nikolov, P. (2013), Inventory developments in the euro area since the onset of the crisis, 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area (QREA), Directorate General Economic and Financial 
Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Comission 12, 33–38. 
Nilsen, J. H. (2002), Trade credit and bank lending channel, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 34, 226–253. 
Petersen, M. and Rajan, R. G. (1994), The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from 
small business data, The Journal of Finance 49, 3–37. 
Petersen, M. and Rajan, R. G. (1997), Trade credit: Theories and evidence, Review of Financial 
Studies 10, 661–691. 
Rajan, R. G. and Zingales, L. (1995), What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence 
from international data, The Journal of Finance 50, 1421-1460. 
Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (1998), Power in a Theory of the Firm, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 113, 387-432. 
Rauch, J. E. (1999), Networks versus markets in international trade, Journal of International 
Economics 48, 7–35. 
Roodman, D. (2009),  How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in 
Stata. Stata Journal 9, 86-136 
Smith, J. K. (1987), Trade credit and informational asymmetry, The Journal of Finance 42, 
868–872. 
26 
 
 
Wilner, B. S. (2000), The exploitation of relationships in financial distress: The case of trade 
credit, The Journal of Finance 55, 153–178.  
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Accounts receivable relative to sales (TD) and stock of 
inventories relative to sales (Stock) for non-financial euro-area 
corporations over the period 2006-2015.  
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AMADEUS database 
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Figure 2: Average standardized (z-score) level of accounts receivable for 
non-financial euro-area corporations over the period 2006-2015.  
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AMADEUS database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Average level of uncertainty faced by non-financial euro-area 
corporations over the period 2008-2015.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AMADEUS database (see 
footnote 20 for details) 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Notes: The table reports means with standard deviations in parentheses. ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ equals 1 in 2010-2011, and 0 otherwise. ܦ𝑖݂݂݁ݎ݁݊ݐ𝑖𝑎ݐ݁݀ 
equals 1 for firms in the differentiated sector and 0 for firms in the standardized sector. 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡: Difference between the present year and the 
firm’s date of incorporation. 𝐿݊ሺ 𝐴݃݁𝑖ݐ): Logarithm of 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡. ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡: Real total assets, measured in thousands of euros and deflated using 
each country’s GDP deflator. 𝐿݊ሺܵ𝑖ݖ݁𝑖ݐሻ: Logarithm of ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡. Appendix C contains definitions of all other variables. Appendix D provides 
details of which industrial sectors are classified as differentiated and standardized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Full  
Sample 
Crisis Non-crisis Diff. Differentiated Standardized Diff. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) ܶܦ௜𝑡 0.280 0.282 0.278 0.000 0.277 0.150 0.000 
 (0.196) (0.200) (0.194)  (0.195) (0.147)  𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 28.440 28.568 28.408 0.001 27.942 29.061 0.000 
 (15.022) (14.844) (15.066)  (14.752) (0.548)  𝐿݊ሺ𝐴݃݁௜𝑡ሻ 3.209 3.225 3.205 0.000 3.193 3.195 0.000 
 (0.545) (0.512) (0.553)  (0.541) (0.619)  ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 8408.925 8312.989 8432.96 0.059 8029.876 8882.006 0.000 
 (16,345.91) (16,252.56) (16,369.15)  (15,828.79) (16,957.38)  𝐿݊ሺܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡ሻ 8.186 8.187 8.163 0.879 8.145 8.237 0.000 
 (1.202) (1.188) (1.212)  (1.190) (1.216)  ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 0.159 0.158 0.160 0.004 0.167 0.150 0.000 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)  (0.153) (0.147)  ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 0.225 0.223 0.225 0.002 0.199 0.257 0.000 
 (0.187) (0.187) (0.187)  (0.178) (0.194)  𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 0.043 0.041 0.044 0.000 0.045 0.040 0.000 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.046)  (0.047) (0.044)  𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.791 0.108 0.094 0.000 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.129)  (0.133) (0.123)  𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 0.079 0.082 0.078 0.000 0.075 0.085 0.000 
 (0.121) (0.123) (0.120)  (0.118) (0.124)  
Observations 411,987 82,539 329,448  228,725 183,262  
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Table 2: The inventory-management motive 
 
Note: All specifications are estimated using a system-GMM estimator. The figures in parentheses are t-
statistics, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 equals 1 in 2010-2011, and 0 otherwise. 
Appendix C contains definitions of all other variables. We include country, industry, and time dummies, 
as well as time dummies interacted with industry dummies, in all models. Instruments include all 
regressors lagged twice or more (with the exception of the 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 and ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡). Sargan is a test of 
overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Ar(j) is a test 
of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) 
under the null of no serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Baseline Crisis 
 (1) (2) ܶܦ௜𝑡−ଵ 0.394*** 0.488*** 
 (4.35) (3.75) 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 0.006 0.002 
 (1.63) (0.48) ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 0.014* 0.018 
 (1.88) (1.57) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 -0.174*** -0.123** 
 (-3.57) (-2.45) ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡  0.061** 
  (2.17) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 × ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡  -0.315** 
  (-2.03) ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 -0.104** -0.132* 
 (-2.47) (-1.76) 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 0.439* -0.180 
 (1.84) (-0.53) 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 -0.046* 0.160 
 (-1.68) (0.90) 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 0.366*** 0.315*** 
 (5.34) (3.27) 
Observations 411,987 411,987 
Number of id 122,430 122,430 
Ar(1) 0.000 0.000 
Ar(2) 0.006 0.021 
Sargan (p-value)             0.051 0.039 
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Table 3: Inventory-management motive accounting for the type of goods 
traded 
 
Note: All specifications are estimated using a system-GMM estimator. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. We include country, industry, and time dummies, as well as time 
dummies interacted with industry dummies, in all models. ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 equals 1 in 2010-2011, and 0 otherwise. 
Appendix C contains definitions of all other variables. Appendix D provides details of which industrial sectors 
are classified as differentiated and standardized. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more 
(with the exception of 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 and ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡). Sargan is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. Ar(j) is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistically 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 Differentiated Standardized  Differentiated Standardized 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) ܶܦ௜𝑡−ଵ 0.547*** 0.479*** 0.605*** 0.476** 
 (6.39) (3.52) (4.56) (2.27) 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 -0.000 0.017*** 0.002 0.011 
 (-0.05) (2.99) (0.46) (1.33) ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 0.021** -0.011 0.042*** -0.017 
 (2.55) (-0.99) (2.74) (-0.97) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 -0.154*** -0.068 -0.162** -0.005 
 (-2.71) (-1.18) (-2.43) (-0.07) ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡   0.125** -0.018 
   (2.16) (-0.38) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 × ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡   -0.638*** 0.051 
   (-2.70) (0.20) ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 -0.083* -0.026 -0.313*** 0.117 
 (-1.73) (-0.47) (-2.84) (1.22) 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 0.686*** 0.626* 0.576 0.190** 
 (2.94) (1.76) (1.24) (2.03) 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 -0.096*** -0.037 -0.254 0.234 
 (-3.43) (-0.91) (-0.92) (1.10) 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 0.293*** 0.267*** 0.347*** 0.037** 
 (3.93) (2.82) (2.79) (2.09) 
Observations 228,725 183,262 228,725 183,262 
Number of id 69,309 53,121 69,309 53,121 
Ar(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar(2) 0.000 0.043 0.039 0.033 
Ar(3) 0.544 0.748 0.8581 0.192 
Sargan (p-value)             0.010 0.150 0.453 0.482 
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 Table 4: Inventory-management motive accounting for financial development  
 Note: All specifications are estimated using a system-GMM estimator. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. We include country, industry, and time dummies, as well as time 
dummies interacted with industry dummies, in all models. 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝑡 indicates the ratio of private credit to GDP in 
columns 1 and 3, and the ratio of bank assets to GDP in columns 2 and 4. ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 equals 1 in 2010-2011, and 0 
otherwise. Appendix C contains definitions of all other variables. Instruments include all regressors lagged two 
(three) times or more in column 1 (2) and 2 (4), with the exception of 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡, ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡, and 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝑡. Sargan is a test of 
overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Ar(j) is a test of jth-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 FD= FD= FD= FD= 
 Private Bank 
Credit to GDP 
Bank Assets to 
GDP 
Private Bank 
Credit to GDP 
Bank Assets to 
GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) ܶܦ௜𝑡−ଵ 0.226*** 0.260*** 0.399*** 0.475*** 
 (5.53) (6.18) (5.68) (6.40) 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.038*** 
 (-4.98) (-5.50) (-3.70) (-3.98) ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 
 (8.99) (9.43) (3.83) (4.08) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 -0.435*** -0.693*** -0.670*** -0.710*** 
 (-5.06) (-8.10) (-4.02) (-3.76) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 × 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝑡 0.219*** 0.356*** 0.297*** 0.304*** 
 (3.09) (5.86) (2.59) (2.70) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 × ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 × 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝑡   0.130*** 0.046** 
   (2.77) (2.22) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 × ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡   -0.142*** -0.056** 
   (-2.76) (-2.10) 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝑡 × ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡   -0.230*** -0.074** 
   (-3.02) (-2.00) ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡   0.241*** 0.022** 
   (3.00) (2.43) 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝑡 -0.003 0.005 0.010 -0.019 
 (-0.25) (0.33) (0.33) (-0.72) ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 -0.183*** -0.171*** -0.065* -0.043 
 (-5.89) (-4.83) (-1.92) (-1.27) 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 0.112 0.225*** -0.240 -0.329 
 (1.57) (2.84) (-0.85) (-1.44) 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 -0.629*** -0.774*** -0.006 0.561*** 
 (-5.39) (-6.65) (-1.05) (3.09) 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 0.844*** 0.816*** 0.514** 0.041*** 
 (6.94) (6.16) (2.47) (4.13) 
Observations 411,987 411,987 411,987 411,987 
Number of id 122,430 122,430 122,430 122,430 
Ar(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar(2) 0.328 0.143 0.000 0.000 
Ar(3)   0.176 0.270 
Sargan (p-value)                    0.021 0.016 0.029 0.036 
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Table 5: Inventory-management motive using different definitions of the 
crisis  
 
Note: All specifications are estimated using a system-GMM estimator. The figures in parentheses are t-
statistics, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 equals 1 in 2010-12 (column 1), 2007-2011 
(column 2), 2007-2012 (column 3), and 0 otherwise. Appendix C contains definitions of all other variables. 
We include country, industry, and time dummies, as well as time dummies interacted with industry 
dummies, in all models. Instruments include all regressors lagged twice or more (with the exception of the 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 and ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡). Sargan is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null 
of instrument validity. Ar(j) is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Crisis: 2010-2012  Crisis: 2007-2011 Crisis: 2007-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) ܶܦ௜𝑡−ଵ 0.375*** 0.443*** 0.389*** 
 (2.96) (3.38) (2.86) 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 0.004 0.003 0.006 
 (1.04) (0.94) (1.56) ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 -0.002 0.017 -0.000 
 (-0.21) (1.54) (-0.03) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡  -0.074* -0.128** -0.077* 
 (-1.69) (-2.51) (-1.79) ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 0.035* 0.073*** 0.044** 
 (1.80) (3.03) (2.31) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 × ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 -0.164*** -0.269** -0.205* 
 (-2.92) (-2.12) (-1.96) ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 -0.062 -0.139* -0.106** 
 (-1.40) (-1.82) (-2.19) 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 -0.240 -0.285 -0.385 
 (-0.65) (-0.78) (-0.98) 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 -0.014*** 0.217 -0.018*** 
 (-2.67) (1.18) (-3.16) 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 0.366*** 0.336*** 0.376*** 
 (4.17) (3.39) (3.98) 
Observations 411,987 411,987 411,987 
Number of id 122,430 122,430 122,430 
Ar(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar(2) 0.098 0.032 0.123 
Sargan (p-value)              0.081 0.066 0.029 
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Table 6: Inventory-management motive differentiating countries by legal origin 
Note: Countries based on French civil law are Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
All specifications are estimated using a system-GMM estimator. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 equals 1 in 2010-2011, and 0 otherwise. Appendix C 
contains definitions of all other variables. We include country, industry and time dummies, as well as time 
dummies interacted with industry dummies, in all models. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times 
or more (with the exception of the 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 and ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡). Sargan is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed 
as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Ar(j) is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 French civil  
law countries 
Other 
countries 
French civil 
law countries 
Other 
countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) ܶܦ௜𝑡−ଵ 0.378*** 0.469** 0.444*** 0.439* 
 (4.44) (1.98) (8.09) (1.70) 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 0.008* -0.015** 0.021*** 0.003 
 (1.93) (-2.09)          (4.95) (0.67) ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 0.012 0.046** -0.017** -0.001 
 (1.51) (2.08) (-2.42) (-0.17) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 -0.153*** -0.073 -0.085** -0.022 
 (-3.37) (-0.63) (-2.19) (-0.20) ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡   0.631*** 0.007 
   (5.78) (0.80) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 × ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡   -0.135*** 0.150 
   (-6.49) (0.56) ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 -0.110** -0.082 -0.143*** -0.147 
 (-2.54) (-0.86) (-4.57) (-1.24) 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 0.444* -0.492 0.126 -0.897* 
 (1.84) (-0.89) (0.60) (-1.88) 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 -0.047* 0.083 0.018 0.169* 
 (-1.75) (0.71) (0.96) (1.82) 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 0.377*** 0.246  0.313*** 0.230 
 (5.44) (1.51) (4.89) (1.08) 
Observations 375,133 36,854 375,277 36,854 
Number of id 110,495 11,935 110,567 11,935 
Ar(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar(2) 0.007 0.448 0.252 0.679 
Ar(3) 0.744 0.452 0.232 0.381 
Sargan (p-value)             0.001 0.359 0.020 0.008 
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Table 7: Inventory-management motive using alternative definitions of 
trade credit extended  
 
Note: All specifications are estimated using a system-GMM estimator. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 equals 1 in 2010-2011, and 0 otherwise. In columns (1) and (2), TD 
denotes the accounts receivable to assets ratio, whilst in columns (3) and (4), it denotes the net trade credit to sales ratio. 
Appendix C contains definitions of all other variables. We include country, industry, and time dummies, as well as time 
dummies interacted with industry dummies, in all models. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more 
(with the exception of the 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 and ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡). Sargan is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. AR(j) is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistically significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
 TD= trade credit 
extended/assets 
TD= trade credit 
extended/assets 
TD= Net trade 
credit 
TD= Net trade 
credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) ܶܦ௜𝑡−ଵ 0.420*** 0.435***   
 (4.36) (4.87)   𝑁ܶܥ௜𝑡−ଵ   0.922*** 0.894*** 
   (17.80) (19.61) 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 0.065 -0.010*** 0.000 0.004 
 (1.10) (-3.07) (0.05) (0.84) ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 0.013*** -0.010 0.007 0.003 
 (2.96) (-1.50) (1.26) (0.36) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 -0.202*** -0.252*** -0.069** -0.123** 
 (-3.47) (-5.40) (-2.01) (-2.19) ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡  0.137***  0.056*** 
  (3.48)  (2.67) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 × ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡  -0.733***  -0.286** 
  (-3.54)  (-2.44) ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 -0.135*** -0.160*** -0.056* 0.001 
 (-3.70) (-4.84) (-1.69) (0.06) 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 -0.234 -0.033 -0.480** 0.846*** 
 (-1.01) (-1.53) (-2.47) (3.05) 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 -0.020*** 0.065 0.026 -0.190*** 
 (-3.16) (1.16) (1.18) (-4.39) 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 0.139*** 0.119 0.065* 0.159* 
 (3.22) (0.86) (1.95) (1.92) 
Observations 394,130 394,130 410,743 410,743 
Number of id 119,407 119,407 122,030 122,030 
Ar(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar(2) 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Ar(3) 0.528 0.639 0.762 0.888 
Sargan (p-value)             0.063 0.013 0.303 0.167 
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Online Appendix  
Appendix A: Sample selection 
We use data in the AMADEUS database from Bureau Van Dijk. We start with an initial sample 
of 1,803,285 firm-year observations. Following standard practice in the literature, we control 
for the potential influence of outliers by excluding observations in the 1% tails for each of our 
regression variables. After removing outliers, our sample contains 1,250,439 firm-year 
observations. We also remove observations with negative sales and assets, which further 
reduces our sample to 1,078,228 firm-year observations. In addition, we drop firm-year 
observations that do not have complete records on the variables in our regressions, leaving us 
with a sample of 1,050,539 observations. Furthermore, we drop firms with fewer than three 
years of consecutive observations from the sample. This is justified, considering that when 
using the system-GMM estimator, we estimate equations in both levels and first differences, 
using values of the regressors lagged twice or more as instruments. Because our main 
specification is dynamic, we need at least three cross-sectional observations for each firm. This 
leaves us with a sample of 411,987 firm-year observations (corresponding to 72,172 firms), 
which is the sample used for the OLS, within-group, and system-GMM estimates. For the first-
difference GMM estimates, due to first-differencing and to the use of lagged regressors as 
instruments, the sample only consists of 313,110 firm-year observations. Finally, we allow for 
entry and exit of firms, because using an unbalanced panel partially mitigates potential 
selection and survivorship bias. 
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Appendix B: Accounts receivable, sales, and inventories: Mean values by country  
 
 Notes: The table reports mean values of accounts receivable (column 1), sales (column 2), the stock of inventories 
(column 4), the accounts receivable to sales ratio (column 3), and the inventory stock to sales ratio (column 5) for 
each of the countries in our sample. 
 
Appendix C: Variables definitions 
 
Note: Appendix D provides details of which industrial sectors are classified as differentiated and standardized. 
 Accounts 
Receivable 
Sales (Accounts 
Receivable)/Sales 
Inventory 
stock 
Inventory 
stock / 
Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Austria 5,103.93 33,716.95 0.151 7,015.18 0.208 
Belgium 5,113.78 22,071.67 0.232 3,919.87 0.178 
Finland 830.639 7,988.33 0.104 1,132.49 0.142 
France 1772.208 9,206.24 0.193 1,302.33 0.142 
Germany 3,312.43 37,640.41 0.088 5,232.98 0.139 
Greece 4,050.04 6,828.43 0.593 1,427.78 0.209 
Ireland 5,132.38 22,122.00 0.232 5,116.26 0.231 
Italy 2,295.50 8,227.47 0.279 1,180.15 0.143 
Netherlands 2,918.25 8,333 0.350 1,080.50 0.130 
Portugal 2,984.62 6,275.23 0.476 900.57 0.144 
Spain 3,489.19 9,400.52 0.372 1138.445 0.121 
ܶܦ௜𝑡 Ratio of accounts receivable to total sales 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 Logarithm of the difference between the 
present year and the firm’s date of 
incorporation ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 Logarithm of real total assets ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 Ratio of inventory stock to total sales 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 Ratio of operating profits (or loss) to 
total sales ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 Ratio of tangible assets to total assets 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 Ratio of cash and equivalents to total 
sales 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 Ratio of short-term debt to total sales ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 Dummy variable equal to 1 in the years 
2010-2011, and 0 otherwise ܦ𝑖݂ ௝݂ Dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in 
the differentiated sector, and 0 otherwise 𝐹ܦ𝑐𝑡 Proxy for financial development, 
measured based on the size (ratio of 
private bank credit to GDP) and liquidity 
(ratio of bank assets to GDP) of the 
banking sector 
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Appendix D: Industrial classification based on the characteristics of the 
goods produced 
Notes: This table presents the classification of industry groups, distinguishing between differentiated and 
standardized products in the manufacturing sector. This classification follows Giannetti et al. (2011), and is based 
on Rauch (1999). In column 3, the number 1 denotes firms in differentiated sectors, whereas 0 represents firms in 
standardized sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
US SIC code Sectors Differentiated 
10 Metal mining 0 
20 Food and kindred products 0 
22 Textile mill products 0 
23 Apparel and other finished 
products made from fabrics and 
similar materials 
0 
24 Lumber and wood products, 
except furniture 
0 
25 Furniture and fixtures 1 
26 Paper and allied products 0 
27 Printing, publishing, and allied 
industries 
1 
28 Chemicals and allied products 0 
29 Petroleum refining and related 
industries 
0 
30 Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastics products 
1 
31 Leather and leather products 0 
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete 
products 
1 
33 Primary metal industries 0 
34 Fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and transportation 
equipment 
1 
35 Industrial and commercial 
machinery and computer 
equipment 
1 
36 Electronic and other electrical 
equipment and components, 
except computer equipment 
1 
37 Transportation equipment 1 
38 Instruments; photographic, metal, 
and optical goods; watches and 
clocks 
1 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 
industries 
1 
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Appendix E: Structure of the unbalanced panel  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table shows the number of observations, percentage, and cumulative 
distribution by year. 
 
Appendix F: Correlation matrix 
 
Notes: This table presents correlation coefficients for the main variables included in our models. Appendix C contains definitions of all 
variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
3 17,537 4.26 4.26 
4 80,832 19.62 23.88 
5 5,996, 1.46 25.33 
6 12,206 2.96 28.29 
7 21,658 5.26 33.55 
8 37,710 9.15 42.70 
9 72,364 17.56 60.27 
10 18,738 4.55 64.82 
11 29,237 7.10 71.91 
12 42,823 10.39 82.31 
13 72,886 17.69 100.00 
 ܶܦ௜𝑡 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 ܶܦ௜𝑡 1.000        𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 -0.038*** 1.000       ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 0.190*** 0.230*** 1.000      ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 0.109*** 0.059*** 0.206*** 1.000     𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 0.007*** 0.027*** 0.055*** -0.143*** 1.000    𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 -0.014*** 0.070*** -0.036*** -0.082*** 0.374*** 1.000   ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 0.013*** 0.047*** 0.136*** -0.042*** -0.028*** -0.120*** 1.000  𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 0.364*** -0.021*** 0.182*** 0.269*** -0.227*** -0.205*** 0.156*** 1.000 
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Appendix G: Dynamic models of trade credit 
Notes: This table contains estimates of equation (1) obtained using the first-difference GMM (column 1), the pooled OLS 
(column 2), and the fixed-effects (column 3) estimators. Appendix C contains definitions of all variables.  We include 
country, industry, and time dummies, as well as time dummies interacted with industry dummies, in all specifications. In 
column 1, instruments include all regressors (except 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡) lagged twice or more. Sargan is a test of overidentifying 
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Ar(j) is a test of jth-order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. For the pooled 
regression (column 2), t-statistics in parentheses are asymptotically cluster-robust to heteroskedasticity. For the fixed-
effects regression (column 3), ρ indicates the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved 
heterogeneity. *, **, and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 First-difference 
GMM 
OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) ܶܦ௜𝑡−ଵ 0.032*** 0.755*** 0.110*** 
 (5.04) (404.85) (65.20) 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 0.014* 0.004*** -2.532 
 (1.88) (11.16) (-0.92) ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 0.006 0.001*** 0.071*** 
 (1.63) (8.07) (87.53) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 -0.174*** -0.019*** -0.045*** 
 (-3.57) (-11.42) (-17.05) ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 -0.104** -0.029*** -0.225*** 
 (-2.47) (-27.94) (-88.43) 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 0.439* 0.147*** -0.059*** 
 (1.84) (30.67) (-9.26) 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 -0.046* -0.012*** -0.190*** 
 (-1.68) (-7.58) (-73.57) 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 0.366*** 0.253*** 0.415*** 
 (5.34) (102.91) (151.30) 
Observations 313,110 411,987 411,987 
R2  0.652 0.145 
Adjusted R2  0.652 0.145 
Ρ   0.996 
Ar(1) 0.000   
Ar(2) 0.113   
Sargan (p-value) 0.011   
Appendix H: Inventory management motive by country 
Notes: We estimate all specifications using a system-GMM estimator. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Appendix C 
contains definitions of all variables. We include country, industry, and time dummies, as well as time dummies interacted with industry dummies, in all models.  Instruments 
include all regressors (with the exception of age) lagged two (three) times or more in columns 1 to 3 and 6 to 11 (4 and 5). Sargan is a test of overidentifying restrictions, 
distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Ar(j) is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) 
under the null of no serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) ܶܦ௜𝑡−ଵ 0.144 0.188 0.110 0.746*** 0.400*** 0.160 0.198 0.018 0.038 0.685*** 0.268*** 
 (0.86) (1.36) (1.58) (11.15) (2.96) (1.15) (1.19) (0.58) (0.22) (5.34) (3.99) 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 0.018*** -0.003 0.001 -0.010** 0.004*** -0.012 -0.006 0.019*** -0.029 0.020* 0.010** 
 (2.74) (-0.44) (0.30) (-2.27) (2.86) (-0.39) (-0.59) (3.70) (-0.96) (1.77) (2.15) ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡 -0.008 0.019 -0.009 0.022*** -0.003 0.078 -0.255 -0.003 0.027 -0.016 0.198*** 
 (-0.49) (1.12) (-0.82) (2.96) (-1.54) (1.49) (-1.24) (-0.30) (1.50) (-0.84) (3.11) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 -0.245** -0.315** -0.091* -0.062** -0.127* -0.197* -0.021** -0.076** -0.025** -0.258*** -0.147*** 
 (-2.14) (-2.00) (-1.68) (-2.53) (-1.72) (-1.77) (-2.12) (-2.42) (-2.25) (-5.14) (-4.82) ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡 -0.244* -0.012 -0.026 -0.073*** -0.033 -0.401*** -0.042 -0.094*** -0.013 -0.153** -0.095*** 
 (-1.91) (-0.18) (-0.86) (-3.57) (-1.32) (-3.00) (-0.41) (-4.54) (-0.06) (-2.07) (-4.67) 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡 0.718 -0.203 -0.130 0.190** 0.249** 0.287** 0.167 0.103*** -0.792 0.299* 0.299* 
 (1.55) (-1.12) (-1.03) (2.43) (2.05) (1.98) (0.91) (4.38) (-1.59) (1.91) (1.91) 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡 0.229 0.015 0.010 0.003 -0.016 -0.344 -0.073 -0.434** 0.424 -0.438 -0.438 
 (1.15) (0.25) (0.26) (0.21) (-0.45) (-0.71) (-0.89) (-2.87) (1.64) (-1.56) (-1.56) 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡 -0.035 -0.012 0.257** 0.307*** 0.067 0.942*** -0.065 0.596*** -0.204 0.996*** 0.473*** 
 (-0.41) (-0.18) (2.25) (3.00) (0.42) (3.50) (-0.52) (12.65) (-0.75) (3.72) (6.69) 
Observations 2,627 5,118 11,329 101,536 17,073 5,106 575 186,283 22,237 23,728 36,375 
Number of id 898 1,574 2,456 21,162 6,942 1,348 219 66,589 4,217 4,955 12,070 
Ar(1) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar(2) 0.492 0.391 0.257 0.000 0.564 0.947 0.725 0.002 0.234 0.175 0.348 
Ar(3) 0.121 0.376 0.486 0.644 0.085 0.080 0.310 0.091 0.485 0.996 0.777 
Sargan  
(p-value) 
0.740 0.118 0.097 0.027 0.585 0.684 0.771 0.065 0.994 0.011 0.034 
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Appendix I: Inventory management motive by country taking the crisis into account 
Notes: We estimate all specifications using a system-GMM estimator. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 equals 1 in 2010-2011, and 0 
otherwise. Appendix C contains definitions of all other variables. We include country, industry, and time dummies, as well as time dummies interacted with industry dummies, in all models. Instruments 
include all regressors (with the exception of age and the crisis dummy) lagged two (three) times or more in columns 1 to 3 and 6 to 11 (4 and 5). Sargan is a test of overidentifying restrictions, 
distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Ar(j) is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) ܶܦ௜𝑡−ଵ -0.020 0.339 0.498** 0.027*** 0.587*** 0.125 0.413** 0.052 0.616*** 0.721*** 0.499*** 
 (-0.13) (1.34) (2.57) (5.25) (4.49) (1.02) (2.15) (0.87) (8.75) (13.87) (4.75) 𝐴݃݁௜𝑡 0.024*** -0.011 0.005 -0.017 0.003*** -0.080 -0.003 0.052*** 0.014** 0.011 0.013* 
 (3.09) (-1.34) (0.94) (-1.63) (2.70) (-1.58) (-0.37) (3.51) (2.10) (1.00) (1.92) ܵ𝑖ݖ݁௜𝑡  -0.007 0.062** 0.026 0.037** -0.002 0.204** -0.019 0.043 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 
 (-0.33) (2.15) (1.52) (1.99) (-1.13) (2.21) (-1.51) (1.29) (-1.00) (-0.62) (-1.05) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡  -0.045* -0.074*** -0.189* -0.124* -0.013*** -0.036* -0.091*** -0.038*** -0.094* -0.019*** -0.110** 
 (-1.94) (-3.21) (-1.81) (-1.77) (-4.58) (-1.91) (-3.21) (-8.06) (-1.84) (-3.21) (-2.01) ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡  0.037* 0.045* 0.096* 0.090* 0.051* 0.047** 0.303** 0.075*** 0.045** 0.073*** 0.050*** 
 (1.90) (1.91) (2.13) (1.81) (1.79) (2.04) (1.99) (3.53) (2.52) (5.17) (2.74) ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜𝑡 × ܥݎ𝑖ݏ𝑖ݏ𝑡 -0.209* 
(-2.59) 
-0.435* 
(-1.72) 
-0.801** 
(-2.25) 
-0.489* 
(-1.82) 
-0.359* 
(-1.67) 
-0.158* 
(-1.87) 
-0.369* 
(-1.67) 
-0.565*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.152* 
(-1.79) 
-0.028*** 
(-4.84) 
-0.144* 
(-1.67) ܥ݋݈݈𝑎ݐ݁ݎ𝑎݈௜𝑡  -0.399*** 
(-2.93) 
0.132 
(1.17) 
-0.028 
(-0.41) 
-0.120 
(-0.83) 
-0.051 
(-1.00) 
-0.478*** 
(-3.06) 
0.048 
(0.38) 
-0.008 
(-0.37) 
-0.113 
(-1.40) 
-0.243*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.766** 
(-2.17) 𝑃ݎ݋݂𝑖ݐ௜𝑡  0.428 -0.041 0.096** 0.342 -0.017 -0.113 0.282 -0.131 0.022*** 0.178*** 0.361*** 
 (1.22) (-0.19) (2.13) (1.43) (-0.13) (-0.29) (1.12) (-0.33) (3.02) (3.23) (2.59) 𝐿𝑖ݍݑ𝑖݀𝑖ݐݕ௜𝑡  -0.224* -0.022 0.086 0.163 0.006 0.250 -0.152 -0.226*** -0.027*** -0.397* -0.119 
 (-1.84) (-0.29) (0.30) (1.04) (0.15) (1.06) (-1.36) (-2.79) (-7.58) (-1.69) (-1.45) 𝐿݋𝑎݊ݏ௜𝑡  -0.088 -0.058 -0.259 0.069 0.002 0.476** 0.082 0.072 0.179* 0.176** 0.271** 
 (-0.90) (-0.53) (-1.21) (0.38) (0.01) (2.53) (0.46) (0.47) (1.94) (2.26) (2.46) 
Observations 2,627 5,118 11,329 101,536 17,073 5,106 575 186,283 23,237 23,728 36,375 
Number of id 898 1,574 2,456 21,162 6,942 1,348 219 66,589 4,217 4,955 12,070 
Ar(1) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar(2) 0.943 0.682 0.584 0.000 0.480 0.764 0.596 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.053 
Ar(3) 0.236 0.413 0.259 0.677 0.056 0.088 0.762 0.010 0.989 0.344 0.910 
Sargan  
(p-value) 
0.935 0.465 0.986 0.990 0.437 0.080 0.244 0.527 0.025 0.015 0.071 
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